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CHARTER ON ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF
STATES: A SOLUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT AID PROB-
LEM?
On May 18, 1972, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) approved resolution 45 (III), thereby focusing attention on
the international social, economic and political problems stemming from the
growing commercial gap between industrialized, developed countries and less-
industrialized, developing countries.' The resolution called for the establish-
ment of a working group under the auspices of the United Nations and UNC-
TAD to prepare a draft charter setting out economic rights and duties of states.
The United Nations General Assembly will decide the ultimate disposition of
the completed draft charter, thus once again making the United Nations the
setting for the recurrent clash between opposing economic theories resulting
from the frustration felt by the developing nations as they continue to fall short
of attaining their goal of a "fair ' 2 share in the international economy. Through
the proposed charter of economic rights and duties of states the developing
countries seek a legally binding commitment that the developed countries will
make a good faith effort, measured by the standards of the charter, to assure
a more equalized distribution of the profits and rewards from global trade and
resource utilization.
To understand the draft charter's emphasis on trade as the means to promote
the advancement of the developing countries and the philosophical conflicts
between the members of the working group and to be able to draw some
conclusions concerning the future of the draft charter, a sketch of one country's
past development aid efforts will be helpful. Although development aid3 comes
'Narrow definitions of the descriptive words used throughout this note are lacking. In keeping
with common usage, the descriptions "developed" and "developing" will correspond to the United
Nations classifications of Group I and Group II countries. More precise definitions must be agreed
upon before a meaningful economic plan based on delineating between developed and developing
countries can be effective. See L. BLACK, THE STRATEGY OF FOREIGN AID 22-28 (1968); U.
KIRDAR, THE STRUCTURE OF UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC-AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1 (1966).
2Once again precise definition is impossible. Suffice it to say that, as exhibited by the developing
countries' representatives to the working group, the fair share of the world economy due the
developing countries has not yet been obtained. See infra note 105.
'"Aid" has a multitude of definitions. A sample would include: (I) "[A] transfer of resources
from the government or citizens of one country to those of another on terms that, from the point
of view of the receivers, are easier than could be obtained on the capital market." E. MASON,
FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY 12 (1964). (2) "[O]fficial foreign aid [is] a transfer of real
resources or immediate claims on resources . ..from one country to another, which would not
have taken place as a consequence of the operation of market forces or in the absence of specific
olficial action designed to promote the transfer by the donor country." R. MIKESELL, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF FOREIGN AID 194 (1968). (3) "[Tihe flow of financial and technical resources from the
developed world to the underdeveloped world." L. BLACK, supra note 1, at I.
Common to the definition of Mason and Mikesell is the notion that "aid" is something which
could not be obtained in the market place. All three definitions, however, permit a wide variety of
forms of aid, from loans on terms just slightly better than commercial terms to outright grants.
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from a number of sources,' aid from the United States has historically been of
great significance because of its magnitude.5 That country's past aid programs
have been based on assumptions and philosophies not unlike those underlying
programs of the other donor countries. For those reasons and for the sake of
brevity, the United States' aid efforts will be utilized in the analysis of the
influence these past programs exert on current attitudes manifested by the
representatives within the working group.
UNITED STATES AID
The Marshall Plan 7 marked the beginning of a true foreign assistance experi-
ence for the United States.' That Plan provided the foreign exchange needed
by western9 European countries to replenish their stocks of working capital
which in turn allowed the repair and replacement of production facilities and
the restoration of the flow of trade. As Europe regained its pre-war self-
reliance, the United States was faced with a global situation which necessitated
The lack of a commonly accepted definition of aid has made it very difficult for agreement to be
reached on the amount of aid a donor country is, or should be, sending to developing countries
and on the amount of aid a country's development needs require. H. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC POLICIES
ToWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 24-25 (1967). For purposes of this note, "aid" will be used
in a broad sense, with no attempt to distinguish between forms of aid.
'UNCTAD, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS 1969, at
153, table 5.4.
5L. BLACK, supra note 1, at 70.
'The common philosophy shared by aid donors is that their foreign aid programs should be
shaped with their own interests primarily in mind. E. MASON, supra note 3, at 3.
In some cases, notably France and the United Kingdom, a major motivation has been
a sense of responsibility to, and desire to maintain the political support of, former
colonial territories, on which development assistance has been concentrated. . . . In
other cases, such as Germany, the long run commercial and political advantages of the
goodwill obtainable by generosity to the developing nations are regarded as important.
In the case of the United States, broad humanitarianism and the moral obligation of
the rich to assist the poor have been inextricably intermingled with the belief in rapid
economic development as a potent strengthener of resistance to domestic communist
influences and generosity in development assistance as an effective means of command-
ing the political and military support - or at least neutrality - of the less developed
nations.
H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 1-2.
It appears, however, that the United States may no longer be representative of the attitudes of
the donor countries. H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 7. It is unclear whether the United States is
truly becoming isolated or whether other donors silently support the American resistance to aid
changes while verbally allying with the developing countries' call for change. Id. at 39.
7Marshall Plan, 62 Stat. 144 (1948).
1E. MASON, supra note 3, at 38.
'Although American aid was restricted to Western European countries it was not all originally
so intended. The Soviet Union and countries under its domination were invited to participate in
the planning stages of the Marshall Plan but walked out of the early meetings. Subsequently, the
growth of the Cold War prevented any further thought of aid to the eastern European countries.
Private communication with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, December 14, 1974.
11E. MASON, supra note 3, at 38.
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the continuation and expansion of its foreign assistance allocations." The new
aid recipients, however, were markedly different from most of the Marshall
Plan participants.'2 Whereas western Europe possessed all the requirements of
recovery and continued development except for foreign exchange, 3 the new aid
donees possessed, typically, primary commodity based economies with little or
no domestic industrial base. 4 These "developing" countries sought support for
their efforts to escape their poverty, generally by attempting to quickly build
an industrial base which would lessen their need for imported manufactured
products.'5 The programs developed to assist these new aid recipients had three
main bases.' While one basis for the effort was a profound humanitarian belief
in helping others,' 7 the other two bases were closely tied to the United States'
perception of its own national interest.' 8 The theory of an economic defense
against the spread of communism provided a potent rationale for supplying aid
to a country in an effort to keep it out of the communist camp.'9 Equally
important was the United States' economic self-interest in seeking to stimulate
and expand international trade and development. 20
A variety of techniques have been developed through the years to dispense
American aid. The relative importance of the three above-mentioned policy
bases vary from technique to technique but generally American self-interest is
the dominant basis.2 ' Military assistance programs have claimed a substantial
amount of the United States aid dollars2  and have generally been justified on
the grounds of security against communism.2 3 However, this paper is con-
cerned with economic development aid and so will concentrate on the non-
military components of United States aid.
President Truman in his inaugural speech of January 20, 1949, provided the
foundation for American foreign-aid policy.24 He pledged the resources of the
United States in a " . . . program for making the benefits of [American]
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and
1R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 4.
21W. Thorp, Foreign Aid: A Report on the Reports in DEVELOPMENT TODAY: A NEw LOOK AT
U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE POOR COUNTRIES 61, at 62 (R. Hunter & J. Rielly ed. 1972).
'
3 E. MASON, supra note 3, at 38.
"L. BLACK, supra note I, at 56-57.
11H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 4.
"1H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 2; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 5; J. NELSON, AID, INFLUENCE,
& Foreign Policy 13 (1968).
'E. MASON, supra note 3. "Humanitarianism as a fundamental motivation has certainly played
an important role in the actions of individual Americans, whether under private or public auspices,
in the underdeveloped areas of the world." Id. at 27.
'E. MASON, supra note 3, at 3; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 4.
"L. BLACK, supra note 1, at 16; E. MASON, supra note 3, at 3; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 4.
1"L. BLACK, supra note 1, at 16.
11R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 5.
22L. BLACK, supra note I, at 86.
'l1d. at 16.
11B. HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 73 (1962).
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growth of underdeveloped areas."2 The Korean War drained off most of the
foreign aid allocations in the form of military assistance until the mid-1950's
when a shift from military aid to economic aid became apparent." The Agricul-
tural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 19542 began the American
surplus agricultural commodities program through which developing countries
were provided with commodities in exchange either for raw materials needed
by United States industries or for foreign currencies which would not adversely
affect the recipient country's balance of payments. 2 The main purpose of the
1954 Act, however, was to dispose of surplus commodities acquired by the
federal government as a part of the United States domestic price support
programs and to expand foreign markets for American agricultural products. 29
In 1961, the various organizations involved in the United States aid efforts were
brought together into the Agency for International Development (AID) within
the Department of State.30 AID now serves as a broker of development assis-
tance' and is the only comprehensive aid agency in the world. 32
Paralleling the official outlets of aid, private investment in developing coun-
tries has been encouraged by providing government guarantees to protect
against loss of investment capital.3 3 Private investors, however, tend to focus
on potential profits and consequently do not often attribute primary impor-
tance to the local economies' development needs which frequently do not result
in monetary profits. 34 The United States also routes some 31 of its aid through
multilateral agencies 36 and participates in several important organizations
2-lnaugural Speech by President Harry S. Truman, January 20, 1949.
26B. HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 76.
27Originally enacted as Act of July 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 480, 68 Stat. 454 (currently codified
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1736 (1970)).
21B. HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 76.
29The preamble of the Act states its purpose to "... increase the consumption of United States
agricultural commodities in foreign countries, to improve the foreign relations of the United States
and for other purposes." Act of July 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 480, 68 Stat. 454. "[Olne need look
no further than the title of the act itself to discover the first, and in the opinion of the committee,
the most important tangible benefit [from the act] Congress had in mind: development abroad of
new and expanded commercial markets for American agricultural products."
H.R. REP. No. 432, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1957), 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425.
See also B. HIGGINS. supra note 24, at 76.
:1"F. COFFIN, WITNESS FOR AID 85 (1964); B. HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 77-78.31F. COFFIN, supra note 30, at 27.
: 
2S. Huntington, Foreign Aid: For What and For Whom in DEVELOPMENT TODAY: A NEW
LOOK AT U.S. RELATIONS WITH TIlE POOR COUNTRIES 21, at 45 (R. Hunter & J. Rielly ed. 1972).
:13Morray, Aid Without Tears: Opportunism in Foreign Development Policy, 46 CAL. L. R.
665, 666 (1958).
:
11d. at 688.
: See B. HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 72; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 238.
:"Some of the multilateral agencies through which American aid flows are:
(I) World Bank Group: In 1944, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
was founded to provide long term credit for economic development on somewhat better than
commercial terms.
As the need for international financing on "softer" terms became apparent, two organs of the
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which serve to influence world commerce and world monetary policies. 7
As more of the industrialized countries entered the field of foreign aid,
various aid coordinating mechanisms developed which were intended to avoid
conflicts in aid policies among the donor countries as well as to avoid overlap-
ping aid requests from recipient states.3 s The largest such mechanism is the
permanent Development Assistance Committee, composed of the thirteen most
important capital exporting members of the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development. 9 Less permanent mechanisms consist of consortia
which bring together various aid donors to a particular country in an effort to
arrive at a common plan for attacking that country's development problems. 0
Also, consultative groups afford donor nations some coordination in aid for a
specific project or program, while general coordinating mechanisms act as
clearinghouses for exchanges of information on aid programs and aid re-
quests."
World Bank were established. In 1956, the International Finance Corporation began providing
capital for ventures too risky to obtain financing from the World Bank, particularly in those
situations where the recipient government was unwilling to guarantee the loan. The International
Development Association, established in 1960, provides development financing for developing
countries on more flexible terms in order to alleviate pressure on the recipient country's balance
of payments.
(2) The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) came into existence January 1, 1966,
following a General Assembly Decision on November 22, 1965, to merge two existing assistance
programs of the United Nations: The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance the United
Nations Special Fund. The technical assistance program was established in 1950 to provide devel-
oping countries short-term technical advisory services, funding for their nationals to study abroad,
and equipment for demonstration and training purposes. The Special Fund, originated nine years
later, focused on large-scale pre-investment projects.
The current role of the UNDP is to provide the governments of developing countries with the
technical and pre-investment assistance needed to: 1) execute survey and feasibility studies of the
economic potential and productive use of natural resources; 2) establish and improve educational
institutions; 3) create and expand research centers; and 4) provide technical, training and advisory
services to build the infrastructure necessary for development.
(3) Regional financing institutions, such as the Inter-American, African, and Asian Development
Banks, although receiving much of their capital and operating funds from developed countries, are
designed to provide development capital for designated underdeveloped countries,
"Established at the same time as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was intended to work with the Bank to prevent a post-war economic crisis and has performed
primarily by financing temporary balance of payments deficits.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was designed as a temporary agreement
pending the commencement of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO never be-
came a functioning body, however, and the GATT has continued and grown into an organization
to promote freer trade among its members. It fosters the growth of tariff and trade policies and
advocates certain trade principles of which the most important is the "most favored nations"
concept whereby tariff reductions negotiated between any two members apply equally to all other
members.
11W. FRIEDMANN, G. KOLMANOFF, R.E. MEAGER, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AID 136 (1966)
(hereinafter cited as W. FRIEDMANN).
39 Id.
01d.
4Id.
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REACTION TO AID PROGRAMS
A rising sense of discontent within the developing countries has accompanied
their receipt of aid." In large measure this is due to changing philosophies of
the donor countries. In line with the general belief that the developing countries
could be assisted through the development of import-substituting industries, 43
early aid was in the form of capital transfers and technical assistance" and was
designed around individual projects. 5 It soon became apparent that this form
of aid alone was ineffective46 and it became common for a donor's aid to a
particular country to be unified into one program which would encompass
numerous specific projects but which affected all aspects of the donee's econ-
omy. 7 Additionally, there was a shift from emphasis on productive industrial
projects to social investment projects aimed at benefiting such areas as health,
education, and housing.' An integral part of this new aid philosophy was donor
insistence on a national development plan49 by which a donee country sets goals
and priorities and assesses its manpower and financial requirements" in order
to assure maximum effect of aid dollars by the donee's domestic mobilization
of resources.5' Basic to the insistence on national development plans is the
concept of "self-help", 5 commonly understood " . . . to imply a willingness
on the part of the . . . [recipient countries] to invest and direct their own
resources toward sensible development goals, to make necessary reforms, and
to minimize or eliminate obstacles to development. 53 It is not difficult to see
why such a definition of "self-help" has been construed as foreign interference
in a country's internal affairs.5 4
Besides complaints about interference in their domestic affairs, donee coun-
tries are dissatisfied with other "strings" attached to aid received from devel-
oped countries. Many of these strings are designed to directly benefit the donor
country itself. For example, United States aid often 5  is "tied" aid, either
required to be used for a specific project or to be used to purchase equipment,
11H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 5-6. See also, infra, The Forum of the United Nations.13H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 4-5; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 22-23.
11H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 52; Albert 0. Hirschman, Foreign Aid-A Critique anda Proposal
at 3, 4 in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE no. 69, July 1968.
5Hirschman, supra note 44, at 4.
4Id.
171d. at 3-4.
1
'R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 23, 25-26.
11L. BLACK, supra note 1, at 124; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 38, at 401.
50L. BLACK, supra note I, at 124.
"Id. at 31; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 135-37.
11L. BLACK, supra note I, at 124-125; R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 157.
11L. BLACK, supra note 1, at 125.
54R. MIKESELL, supra note 3. "The concept that aid will be provided according to the measure
of self-help on the part of the recipient, while seemingly a fair proposition to the don becomes fact
a threat of withdrawal of aid if policies imposed by the donor are not carried out." Id, at 21-22.
1'J. BLACK, supra note 1, at 126.
[Vol. 4:2
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goods and services from the United States." Aid tied to a project reduces the
donee country's flexibility in managing its financial resources57 and aid tied to
United States procurement, while benefiting American businesses, lessens the
value of the aid dollar to the donee."6 Another example of "strings" attached
to aid is the prevalence of aid in the form of loans as contrasted to grants which,
by requiring repayment of principal plus interest, have burdened developing
countries with intolerable debt-services. 9
Aid recipients have pushed for fewer strings accompanying their aid."0 One
possible answer to their demands is the distribution by multilateral organiza-
tions of aid contributed by developed countries. 1 Most recipient countries
would prefer that aid be provided by United Nations agencies or by regional
agencies largely controlled by developing countries.62 At the same time, such a
distribution process would have some appeal to the developed countries "...
in view of efficiency of staffing and administration of aid projects, equity of
distribution of aid among the less developed countries, and maintenance of
harmonious relations between the countries supplying and the countries receiv-
ing aid . . . ."3 Ironically, at least one observer feels that the multilateral
donors are generally able to impose more aid conditions and require a higher
standard of performance than are the unilateral donors, all with less complaint
from the recipient country. 64
The developing countries have also become increasingly critical of the gen-
eral conditions of world commerce which they feel have hindered their develop-
ment.1 Under present conditions, the developing countries are unable to sell
enough of their products in the world markets to reduce their balance of
payments deficits. 6 The developing countries feel that transfers of financial aid
alone are insufficient to narrow the development gap and that trade in conjunc-
tion with direct aid is the only means by which their economies can become
self-sustaining.67 This concern with trade has been argued with increasing fervor
in the United Nations.
51H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 80-81.
171d. at 81-82.
511d. at 24-25; W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 38, at 420.
'As discussed supra in footnote 3, "aid" comes in a variety of forms. Some "aid" is not very
different from regular commercial loans whereby the developing country not only must repay the
face amount of the "aid" but also must pay interest, often at nearly commercial rates. R.
MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 122. The effect of such loan-type "aid" is that more and more aid inflow
must be diverted by the developing country to pay its then due interest on previous "aid". The
result is a decline in the net flow of resources available for development purposes. Id. at 109, fig.
2. See generally id. at 105-126.
6 E. MASON, supra note 3, at 41.
'Id. at 23-25.
62R. MIKESELL, supra note 3, at 1-2.
'63H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 24.
"Private communication with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, February 22, 1973.
" See H. Malmgren, Trade and Development in DEVELOPMENT TODAY: A NEW LOOK AT U.S.
RELATIONS WITH THE POOR COUNTRIES 155, at 155-58 (R. Hunter & J. Rielly ed. 1972).
"Id. at 165-168.
",H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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THE FORUM OF THE UNITED NATIONS
1961 marked the first year in which the United Nations began to be system-
atically utilized in the economic struggle of the developing countries. In that
year a General Assembly resolution called for the establishment of a United
Nations Capital Development Fund to help finance the diversification of the
economies of developing countries with due regard to the need for industrial
development as a basis for social progress.68 The Fund was to provide financial
assistance to be used as directed by the recipient country 9 without accompany-
ing outside interference in the recipient's internal affairs. The proposal ran
counter to the economic and political philosophies behind the aid programs
then administered by the developed countries, however, and was insensitive to
the desires of the donor countries. Consequently it suffered from lack of operat-
ing capital which was to be contributed by developed countries. That same year
international trade was recognized as a primary instrument for economic devel-
opment 70 and the blame for the developing countries' chronic balance of pay-
ments problems was placed on unfavorable trade terms with the industrialized
countries. The latter were given the responsibility for making "all appropriate
efforts to cooperate in accelerating the economic development of the develop-
ing and under developed countries."'" Finally, 1961 saw the commencement of
the First United Nations Development Decade, pursuant to a General Assem-
bly resolution.7 2 This important resolution related economic and social develop-
ment to the attainment of international peace and security called for in the
United Nations Charter.73 Member states were urged to aid developing coun-
tries gain a place in expanding markets, to ensure them an equitable share of
earnings from the extraction and marketing of natural resources, and to pursue
policies resulting in the increased flow to them of public and private develop-
ment resources.74 Quantitative goals were set which foresaw a 5% annual
growth rate in the gross national product of the developing countries financed
by the annual contribution by developed countries of 1% of their gross national
products. 7 .5
The following year, the General Assembly endorsed ECOSOC's decision to
convene the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD).6 UNCTAD, which met in 1964, was the largest and most comprehen-
61G.A. Res. 1706 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
69d.
7 1G.A. Res. 1707 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
7
'id. at 14-15.
72G.A. Res. 1710 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
:ld.: see U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. I & 3.
"G.A. Res. 1710 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
75ld. at para. I.
71G.A. Res. 1785 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). Several
fundamental points were suggested to be considered. The most important of these points were: 1)
the need for increasing the trade of developing countries in primary commodities as well as in semi-
manufactured and manufactured goods so as to insure a rapid expansion of export earnings; 2)
[Vol. 4:2
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sive inter-governmental economic conference theretofore held." Its Final Act
recognized the deteriorating international trade position of the developing
countries and spot-lighted the problems of primary commodity based econo-
mies.7 1 An increase in industries with export potential within the developing
countries was considered essential to the correction of the balance of trade
deficits.78 Perhaps the most significant results of the Conference were the new-
found unity among the developing countries, the Group of 77,80 and the subse-
quent establishment of UNCTAD as a permanent organ of the General Assem-
bly with its day-to-day business to be conducted by the Trade and Development
Board.'
The character of UNCTAD's Final Act resulted from the large majority the
developing countries enjoyed at the Conference and did not accurately reflect
the opinions of the developed countries.82 However, in 1970 there was a step
towards implementation of one of the UNCTAD principles when the Agreed
Conclusions of the Special Committee on Trade Preferences was signed by
more than 120 countries representing both sides of the development issue.83
By the terms of the Conclusions, the developed countries are to extend general-
ized preferential tariff treatment to manufactured and semi-manufactured
goods of the under-developed countries.8 4 The contemplated result will be lower
tariffs by industrialized countries on specified goods from developing coun-
tries. ' ' The pressure for action on the other UNCTAD principles continued
the need for measures which would insure stable, equitable and remunerative prices and the raising
of demand for exports of developing countries; 3) the need for measures which would lead to the
gradual removal of tariff, non-tariff or other trade barriers by industrialized countries which have
an adverse effect on the exports of developing countries and on the expansion of international trade
in general: and 4) methods and machinery to implement measures relating to the expansion of
international trade. Id. at para. 5.
7L. BLACK, supra note 1, at 10.
7gl9 U.N. GAOR, ECOSOC Report, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/5803 (1964).
79d.
IONow including more than 100 countries, the "Group of 77" seeks to act as a common voice
for the developing countries.
1L. BLACK, supra note 1, at 11. Charged with promoting the development of the developing
countries and with promoting international trade, UNCTAD was to formulate principles and
policies on international trade, to review and coordinate efforts of the United Nations in the field
of international trade, and to initiate action for negotiation of multilateral legal instruments in the
field of trade. G.A. Res. 1995 (XIX), 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at I, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1964).
"Proehl, The Geneva Proposals to Reform International Trade: "A Clear Convergence of
Responsibilities?", 33 GEO. WASH. L.R. 1031, 1038 (1965). See H. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 252-
53.
"'U.N. Docs. TD/B/329/Add. 5 - TD/B/AC.5/36/Add. 5 (1970).
"ild.
uComment, Generalized Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries, The UNCTA D Agreed
Conclusions, 10 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. Ill, at 115-118 (1971). The weakness of this plan is its
dependence on national legislative action which must conform with the detailed implementation
of the Conclusions. Id. If one developed country refuses to carry its allocated share of the burden
of these tariff preferences, then the delicate mechanism may fail as the other developed countries
react in an attempt to carry no more than their share. Id. at 116. The United States could well
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with the beginning of the Second United Nations Development Decade in
1970.11 The Strategy for this Decade again called for continuing effort by all
governments to promote social and economic progress in developing coun-
tries.8
7
THE FORMATION OF THE WORKING GROUP
Despite more than ten years of United Nation's resolutions, despite the
creation of UNCTAD, and despite the voluntary aid now given by developed
countries, the economic and social gap between the developing and developed
countries has failed to narrow significantly.88 Not only has the goal of the First
United Nations Development Decade to attain a 5% growth rate for the devel-
oping countries not been reached, but most developing countries have actually
suffered a relative economic shrinkage. 9 The futility of relying solely on direct
transfers of aid to the developing countries had become apparent by 1964 when
the Final Act of UNCTAD's first session stressed the importance of trade in
the developing countries' struggle to reverse their deteriorating financial situa-
tions."' Signing of the Agreed Conclusions on Trade Preferences was recogni-
tion that trade in addition to aid was to be the new goal but the scheme
envisioned by the Agreed Conclusions has not yet been fully implemented.
The steadily worsening situation has led to an attempt by the developing
countries to obtain a legally binding commitment by industrialized countries
to adhere to generally accepted norms governing international economic rela-
tions and thereby assure developing countries the opportunity to partake on a
larger scale in the flow of international trade. President Luis Escheverria Al-
verez of Mexico proposed to UNCTAD's third session in April, 1972, that an
instrument be prepared which would define and protect the economic rights of
all countries, particularly the developing ones." This proposal was endorsed by
the Conference and a working group was named to prepare a draft charter
based on the principles approved by UNCTAD in the Final Act of its first
session, plus any suggestions by its third session. 2 In addition, the principles
in the Charter of Algiers and the Declaration of Lima plus relevant United
prove to be the weak link in the chain as the present protectionist Congress and powerful labor
unions may cause rejection of any plan which would have a detrimental effect on domestic indus-
tries. Id. at 117.
"G.A. Res. 2626(XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
17Id. at para. 19.
"Preamble, G.A. Res. 2626 (XXV), supra note 86.
"
9HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 155, table 5.5.
9
"Proehl, supra note 82.
"U.N. Press Release, TAD/501, 1 Feb. 1973.
21d. The working group, originally 31 members but later enlarged to include 40 states, consisted
of: Australia: Bolivia: Brazil: Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; China; Czechoslovakia; Denmark; Egypt;
France: Germany, Federal Republic of; Guatemala; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Italy; Ivory
Coast: Jamaica; Japan; Kenya; Mexico; Moracco; Netherlands; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Philip-
pines: Poland; Romania; Spain; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; USSR; United Kingdom; United States;
Yugoslavia: Zaire: Zambia. Switzerland was replaced by Belgium prior to the first session.
[Vol. 4:2
CHARTER
Nations resolutions such as the Strategy for the Second Development Decade
will be used for guidance.93
Amplifying President Escheverria's suggestion, Alfonso Garcia Robles of
Mexico outlined for the United Nations General Assembly Second Committee
(Economic and Financial) some of the principles his government felt should be
reflected in the proposed charter: 1) all States have the sovereign right to freely
adopt the social and economic system of their choice and to establish laws
governing ownership of property in the light of public interest; 2) States should
refrain from exerting pressure by economic means; 3) the participation of
foreign capital in the disposition of natural resources should be adapted to the
economic objectives of the recipient countries and should be in line with na-
tional decisions and priorities, and nationalization or expropriation should be
justified by notions of public utility; 4) developed countries should accord
preferential treatment to developing countries on the basis of non-reciprocity
and non-discrimination and should eliminate tariffs or other barriers to the
trade and consumption of products of particular interest to developing coun-
tries; 5) developed countries should adopt measures to compensate for the
effects of substitutes for raw materials and should abolish subsidies for the
production of primary commodities competing with essential exports from
developing countries. 94 The foundations for these principles can be traced to the
complaints directed at the current aid programs designed by the developed
countries.
Ambassador Castefiada of Mexico, the Chairman of the working group,
further expressed the hopes his government had for the charter in a statement
on February 12, 1973, to the first session of the group. 5 The task of the working
group is "to formulate legal, and therefore obligatory, rights and duties" of
States. " Realizing that the General Assembly may decide not to incorporate
the draft charter into a formally binding instrument, he nevertheless felt that
the "draft, itself, should enunciate authentic economic rights and duties of
States in the only way in which it is logically possible to do so: as rights and
duties of a judicial nature intended to be binding if the draft should become a
part of the corpus of international law." '9 7 At the same time, the working
group's goal "is not to formulate a programme of action for the United Na-
tions or the international community."98 This function has already been per-
formed by such documents as the Strategy for the Second Development De-
cade. Rather, the charter will contain certain principles "of a universal nature"
found in those instruments "insofar as they reflect rights and duties of
States." 99
9 3Id.
"d.
"sStatement by the Chairman of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/R.4.
"Id. at 2.
971d.
981d.
Ovid.
19741
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
"Specificity" and "scope" are two potentially insoluble problems with which
the working group must contend. Ambassador Castefiada's statement that the
charter should be "as specific as is politically feasible", 00 is testimony to the
anticipated disagreements on this subject. Equally contentious will be the scope
of the charter: should it be limited to codifying rules already accepted as
international law or should it strive to create new rules which will respond to
the present and future needs of the world community? The Ambassador an-
swers this question by observing that to merely codify the existing international
economic law "would be tantamount to defending the maintenance of the
status quo, which has certainly not promoted the welfare of two-thirds of
mankind."' 0'
The desire to create new norms and to expand the corpus of international
law, however, must be tempered by political reality. Ambassador Castefiada
acknowledges that for the charter to be effective, "it should be an instrument
fundamentally acceptable to, or at least tolerated by, all the main groups of
States."' 0 2 He foresees the principal function of the working group will be to
"negotiate opposing views and to find common denominators for divergent
national interests."10 3 But, at the same time, the role of the developing coun-
tries as providing the stimulus for change is to be recognized and encouraged." 4
As is evident from the above, much of the impetus for the charter has come
from Mexico, a spokesman for the developing countries. The optimism and
enthusiasm of the Mexican representatives can be expected to be met by con-
servative reaction among some of the developed countries who will, after all is
said and done, be the ones who finance the new economic order.
THE DRAFT OUTLINE: FIRST SESSION
The first session of the working group was held from February 12-23, 1973,
in Geneva. 05 The split between the developing and the western developed coun-
tries was immediately apparent in the general exchange of views which opened
the session. 06 The communist countries played an independent role but a pro-
posal submitted by them generally seemed to support the views of the develop-
ing countries. 07 Most of the suggestions, ranging from the general to the spe-
cific, were advanced by the developing countries, with occasional input from
the developed countries in the form of limitations on the more enthusiastic
suggestions of the other members. 00 The United States representative, for
'Id.
101ld.
"Id. at 3.
103 id.
1041d.
'"'Report of the Working Group on the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States
on its first session, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC. 12/I.
'10 ld. at 4-14.
'"'U.N. Doc. A/C.2/L. 1253.
'"'U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/1 at paras. 19 & 24.
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example, only spoke up twice: once to express doubt as to the "advisability,
possibility or feasibility of making the rights and duties formulated in a draft
charter legally binding on States,"'0 9 and once to suggest that since the charter
should be acceptable to all States, it should not include provisions that had been
unacceptable in other contexts."10 He added that "while developed countries
were not indifferent to the problems of developing countries, states might not
be prepared at present to give up the degree of sovereignty that acceptance of
such sweeping juridical commitments might imply.""' Despite this warning
note, the legally binding nature of the charter was urged by some of the mem-
bers of the working group."12
Four working papers were sponsored by various groups of member States,
in addition to a consolidated proposal prepared by some of the sponsors of the
other working papers." 3 These documents were referred to a sub-group of 18
members which was to prepare the first draft of the charter."' The United
States representative again sounded a warning that while some of the proposed
topics were acceptable, other were outside "the scope of the work of the Group
while agreement on many of the topics depended on the final formulation."" '
However, most of the provisions in the draft outline were carried forward into
the alternative provisions of the product of the second session several months
later.
In brief, the sub-group proposed a charter outline with the following main
points: " '
I) Preamble-Affirmation of the principles of the United Nations Charter
with the goal of establishing a new world economic and social order which
would promote higher standards of living and shared prosperity through the
sustained expansion of national economies.
II) Economic Rights and Duties- a) the right to be free from outside interfer-
ence; b) the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources; c) the duty
to fully mobilize internal resources for the economic, social and cultural devel-
opment of the citizenry; d) the desirability of a just and rational division of
labor; e) the right to an equal voice in arriving at international solutions to
economic problems; f) the right to participate in groupings to pursue common
economic and social development; g) the right to equal access to scientific and
technological advances; h) the duty to ensure all States a fair share in world
trade and to co-operate in the development of developing countries; i) the right
to control foreign investment, including transnational corporations; j) the duty
to aid in general disarmament and to allocate the freed resources to develop-
'Ild. at para. 19.
"1d. at para. 28.
"'ld.
"
21d. at para. 18.
"
111d. at 15. (U.N. Docs. TD/B/AC.12/R.6 and Add. 1; R.8; R.9; R.10; & R.I I).
"lid.
"1Id.
"'Id. at 16-24.
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ment of developing countries; k) the right of developing countries to receive
preferential, non-reciprocal trade treatment; 1) the duty of industrialized coun-
tries to conduct their mutual economic relations in a manner which does not
adversely affect interests of third countries; and m) equal application of the
most-favored-nation principle.
Ill) Implementation-The role of international organizations. The ranking
group transmitted this draft outline to governments of members of UNCTAD
for their comments and suggestions.
THE DRAFT CHARTER: SECOND SESSION
The second session of the working group, meeting from July 13-27, 1973,
received comments from thirty-one member States of UNCTAD."7 Two sub-
groups were established to compose the provisions of the draft charter based
primarily on the outline from the first session together with the provisions
suggested by the member States."' It is important to note that it was decided
at the first meeting of the second session not to re-open the discussion of the
legal nature of the final instrument but rather to leave the question to the
General Assembly."' By doing this, a guaranteed source of contention was
removed and the working group could concentrate on its primary function of
determining what are the economic rights and duties of States.
Chairman Castefiada submitted an informal working paper following the
second session based on the consolidated alternative provisions in the texts
produced by the sub-groups. 2 A draft charter was synthesized from this work-
ing paper plus all of the other suggestions, outlines, and texts, and was trans-
mitted to the Trade and Development Board which was then to pass it on to
the General Assembly.' 2' The final text of the document, 22 divided into para-
graphs with alternative provisions in each paragraph, contains certain key
points. These are:
(1) Preamble: Affirms the need for:
(a) the acceleration of the economic growth of the developing countries in
order to narrow or bridge the gap between those countries and developed
countries;
(b) the achievement of a more rational system of international division of
labor, with one alternate provision calling for structural changes in the world
economy;
(c) genuine co-operation among States in order to achieve the just and bal-
anced development of all parts of the world;
"'Report of the Working Group on the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States
on its second session, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2 at 2.
118d.
"'ld. at 3.
"Id. at 45.
111d. at 3.
'
2 U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2 at 45-63.
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(d) two provisions stress the need to strengthen the legal bases for interna-
tional economic co-operation;
(2) Chapter I
(a) economic as well as political relations among States shall be governed
by principles of this charter;
(3) Chapter 11
(a) every State has the right to choose its political, social, economic and
cultural systems without outside interference;
(b) sovereignty over natural resources - the seven alternative provisions on
this point differ mainly in the degree of freedom a State has in disposing of its
resources;
(c) every State has the right to engage in international trade without discrimi-
nation and to enter into bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Also, the
Most-Favored-Nation Principle should be observed by all with exceptions in
favor of developing countries;
(d) every State has the duty to promote the development of its people and is
free to choose the goals and means of such development;
(e) every State has the right to participate in sub-regional, regional and inter-
regional co-operation in the pursuit of its economic and social development;
(f) there is a wide disparity between positions as to whether all States have
a right to benefit from advances in science and technology;
(g) every State has the duty to co-operate in ensuring that all share equitably
in world trade;
(h) while it appears there is a consensus that every State has the right to
regulate and control foreign investment within its jurisdiction some provisions
limit such control to the relevant norms of international law;
(i) States have the right to control and regulate transnational corporations
within their national jurisdiction;
(0) there exists a duty to promote the achievement of general disarmament
and to use the freed resources for economic and social development, particu-
larly of the developing countries;
(k) there is a duty to provide aid for the development of countries;
(1) there is no consensus as to the right of developing countries to receive
generalized, preferential, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment
from developed countries in order to meet their trade and development needs;
(m) the developing countries should receive transfers of financial resources.
There is no consensus among the alternative provisions as to whether developed
States have a duty to make such transfers;
(n) the developing countries should expand their mutual trade and economic
co-operation;
(4) Chapter III
(a) the sea-bed, ocean floor, and resources of the sea are the common heri-
tage of mankind, should be used for the benefit of all mankind, and should be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes;
(b) the protection and enhancement of the environment is a common respon-
sibility.
974]
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Unlike all previous texts, the instrument sent to the Trade and Development
Board does not identify the sponsors of the various alternative provisions.
However, it is apparent that the final instrument although based primarily on
the first session's outline reflects the increased participation of the developed
countries, particularly the United States, during the second session." 3 Most
of the suggestions for changes in the draft outline made by the United States
seemed designed to impart a more realistic viewpoint that equal prosperity for
all may be an unreachable goal and to put on record that a substantial aid
program already exists and is functioning. Some of the more important Ameri-
can suggestions are as follows:
1) Preamble
a) the goal of narrowing the gap between developing and developed countries
should be modified by the phrase "to the extent possible";1
24
b) while admitting the desirability of a more rational system of international
division of labor, the accompanying goal of structural changes in the world
economy should be deleted;'25
c) while co-operation among States based on joint consideration of and
concerted action regarding international economic problems is necessary, it
should read "increased" co-operation and "intensification" of joint considera-
tion;121
2) that economic relations between States "should" be governed by certain
principles, not "shall" be governed; 27
3) Rights and Duties
a) the United States cannot accept the provisions declaring that every State
exercises permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and may dispose of
them freely and fully and that nationalization is an expression of sovereign
power solely within the jurisdiction of that State. Instead, it feels that States
must remain within the framework of international law in the disposition of
its natural resources and that appropriate compensation should be provided
upon nationalization of foreign property; 28
b) while States have the right to engage in international trade and other
forms of economic co-operation and thereby enter into bilateral or multilateral
arrangements, international obligations must be satisfied; 2 9
c) while some governments feel all States have a right to benefit from scien-
'
2
:"The United States Government has carefully reviewed the draft outline prepared by the
Working Group. The United States considers that the work being done by the group is important
and is prepared to contribute to the preparation of a declaration reflecting principles of interna-
tional economic cooperation." United States proposal, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2/Add. I at 45.
'
21U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2 at 4.
'11U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2/Add. I at 47.
'U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2 at 5.
'17This choice of words is based on a desire to parallel as closely as possible the language of
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2/Add. I at 47.
'1Id. at 48.
129ld.
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tific and technological advances, the United States feels that States are merely
required to "facilitate" the "widest possible access" to the benefits of these
advances; 1:10
d) despite the claim that States have, as a sovereign right, the ability to
control foreign investments, the United States suggests that such control is
subject to the relevant norms of international law;'
e) the right of States to control transnational corporations within their juris-
dictions should be deleted; 32
f) developing countries shall receive special consideration of their trade and
development needs, but only as "appropriate". Specific American approval is
withheld from the claimed right of developing countries to preferential and
non-reciprocal trade treatment; 133
g) the United States will only agree to "endeavor to facilitate" the transfer
of financial and technological resources to developing countries;3 4
h) developing countries should expand their mutual trade "within the frame-
work of the international organizations concerned"; 2 5
4) the United States seeks deletion of the question of the resources of the
sea. This is in accord with the view expressed by the American representative
in the first session that certain areas were already under consideration in other
forums, specifically the law of the sea, and that such areas were outside the
scope of the present charter.'3 1
Although the working group was originally supposed to complete its work
within the first two sessions' 37 it has received an extension of its mandate to
13"'The United States supports the broad expansion of benefits from science and technology,
but does not consider that the rights and duties referred to . . .are established under international
law. In the United States view, the attempt to establish such rights and duties would be neither
appropriate nor effective in achieving the goals sought." Id. at 49.
"11d. at 50.
:"'Questions concerning the activities of multinational enterprises are under consideration and
study in a number of United Nations and other bodies. The United States does not consider it
appropriate under international law for States to apply special discriminatory measures of regula-
tion and control to those partially or wholly foreign-owned entities operating within their territory
which they may consider 'transnational'." Id.
""'The United States in Part IV of the GATT has recognized certain principles applicable to
developing countries, but we do not agree that there is a right to trade preference or an unqualified
right to non-reciprocal trade benefits for developing countries." Id. It should be noted that the
Common Market countries supported the granting of non-reciprocal generalized tariff preferences
(U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2 at 34) in keeping with their grant in 1971 of trade preferences to
developing countries pursuant to the Agreed Conclusions on Tariff Preferences. (N.Y. Times, Mar.
31. 1971, at I, col. 6.) The United States has not implemented the Agreed Conclusions.
'
3
1'The United States does not recognize the existence of a right or duty under existing interna-
tional law to transfer financial resources." U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2/Add. I at 5.
13
5Id.
' 
0U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/l para. 21. "Because the Law of the Sea Conference will soon deal
in full with basic questions relating to this area, including rights and duties and an international
regime and machinery, the United States believes that the Working Group should defer to the
Conference with respect to issues related to this issue." U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2/Add. I at 52.
' 
7U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2/Add. I at 52.
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provide for two further sessions. 13 The product of these two later sessions will
then be sent to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session for a decision
upon the opportunity and procedure for the adoption of the charter.'3 9
PROSPECTS FOR THE CHARTER'S IMPLEMENTATION
After two drafting sessions of the working group with two more sessions to
come in 1974, little can be said about the specific provisions likely to be
contained in the final charter draft other than that the provisions will almost
certainly cover those topics contained in the draft outline of the working
group's first session. Technical questions concerning such issues as "What is
the dividing line between a developed and developing country?", 4 ' "Who will
administer and enforce the rights and duties as eventually established?",",' and
"Will the duties of the charter fall only upon the developed countries?" ' 41 will
certainly arise and must be dealt with before the charter can begin functioning.
However, two fundamental questions must be answered first. What will be the
charter's form as decided by the General Assembly and what will its content
eventually be? Although these questions are interrelated, some preliminary
observations may be made concerning each individually.
The charter, as originally envisioned, was to be a legal, and therefore bind-
ing, document. 43 However, the first major disagreement among the members
of the working group at the first session was whether the charter should be
legally binding at all.4 4 The ultimate decision on this issue will be made in the
General Assembly" 5 and could range from letting the charter die by never
taking any action on it, to incorporating the charter in a resolution, either as a
"'U.N. Doc. A/C.2/L. 1295 at 2.
1391d.
""There is no single indicator that satisfactorily differentiates levels of economic development
between various countries. The most commonly used indicator is the GNP per capita, although
many others are used. L. BLACK, supra note I, at 23-26.
"'The most logical choice will be either UNCTAD or GATT. Both of these organizations
possess the personnel and the expertise to resolve the complexities of an economic scheme based
on the draft charter. Unfortunately both organizations have been characterized as favoring one
side or the other of the aid dispute. If favoritism is displayed by the organization chosen to
administer the rights and duties contained in the charter, the "aggrieved" State may well feel free
to cease complying with the charter.
l'2Thus far the disputes in the working group seem to involve "developed" countries and "devel-
oping" countries. However, will the duties imposed by the charter for the benefit of developing
states fall upon all countries, at least in relation to relatively less-wealthy countries? This question
assumes added significance when oil-rich countries, technically now classified as developing coun-
tries, are compared to less fortunate nations with few natural resources. Will one developing
country be required to aid in the development of another? Can a country be a "developing" country
for one purpose and a "developed" country for another? These questions of classification and
attendant rights and duties have not yet been confronted by the working group. It is assumed that
the U.N. General Assembly will answer them before attempting to bring the charter into force.
"'
3Supra note 95, at 1-2.
"'U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/l at 5 & 6.
"'U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2 at 3.
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recommendation or a declaration, to adopting it as a convention which upon
ratification by States would become effective as part of the corpus of interna-
tional law. It is unlikely that the large majority enjoyed by developing countries
in the General Assembly will permit the charter to simply die, unless its final
provisions are so diluted as to be worse than no charter at all in the eyes of
those States which had hoped to benefit from it. On the other hand, if the
General Assembly decides to treat the charter as a convention, reluctance on
the part of developed countries to legally commit themselves may result in only
developing countries becoming signatories."' Therefore, even though immedi-
ate legal status can only be attained by a signed convention or treaty, the
Assembly might well decide that a less binding document in the form of a
resolution is the best alternative. It can be anticipated that some countries
which have expressed sympathy with the goals of developing countries may vote
for a U.N. resolution while balking at the signing of a legally binding docu-
ment. If this route is chosen, what will be the effect of the charter in the form
of a resolution?
. Although at least one writer considers General Assembly resolutions to have
a moral force that "is in fact a nascent legal force which may enjoy . . . a
twilight existence hardly distinguishable from morality and justice until the
time when the imprimatur of the world community will attest to its jural
quality,"'' 7 the more commonly accepted opinion is that voiced by Brierly that
all the Assembly can do is discuss and recommend and that the effect of these
recommendations is only moral, not legal.4 8 It is hoped by many that in the
future there will be an increase in the weight of resolutions so that gradually
they would come to have a binding effect, particularly when they concern the
interpretation of principles of the United Nations Charter. 49 While it can be
argued that the purpose of the draft charter is to promote world peace and co-
operation through economic development to which member States of the
United Nations are pledged by the U.N. Charter, 150 this was not the primary
motivating force behind the establishment of the working group.'5' Any addi-
tional importance as an interpretation of the U.N. Charter would, therefore,
probably be denied the draft charter in the form of a resolution and the impact
of the document would depend on the prestige of a normal resolution.
"'Additionally, for those developed countries which sign the convention, the precise wording of
the convention will have to be to their liking before they undertake a binding commitment to assist
in the development of other nations. The process of negotiating this wording or the composition
of exceptions could be very time consuming.
"'Sloan, The Binding Force of a "Recommendation" of the General Assembly of the United
Nations. 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1948).
111J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 110 (6th ed. 1963). See U.N. CHARTER art. 10.
"'lntroduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
16 June 1960 - 15 June 1961, General Assembly, 16th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. IA, at
3-4; 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1966).
"'U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. I & 3.
"'Press Release, supra note 91.
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In a 1962 memorandum by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs52
concerning the use of the terms "Declaration" and "Recommendation", it was
stated that in U.N. practice, "a 'declaration' is a formal and solemn instru-
ment, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting import-
ance are being enunciated."1 53 A recommendation is considered less formal
although in strict legal practice there is probably no difference between the
two.' 5' However,
• ..in view of the greater solemnity and significance of a 'declaration', it may
be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expecta-
tion that Members of the international community will abide by it. Conse-
quently, in so far as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a
declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding
upon States. 5
Because of this recognized distinction, the General Assembly will probably
choose to approve the draft charter as a declaration with the hope that it will
receive wide-spread compliance so that it will eventually form a part of the
corpus of international law. 5 6
The content of the charter will be the ultimate factor in determining the
effectiveness of the rights and duties enunciated therein. Unless the economic
status quo changes radically, the developing countries will be unable to force
the developed countries to carry out the principles of the charter. The recent
embargo of Arab oil 157 has proved that the supply of at least one natural
resource can be manipulated to coerce the industrialized countries., Absent
such an economic weapon, however, only public opinion can be brought to bear
in the foreseeable future to persuade the developed nations to adhere to the
duties embodied in the draft charter. 59 This will be particularly true if the draft
charter is not forged into a recognized legal document but rather is expressed
as a U.N. resolution.
'U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610.
153/d.
1541d.
'
551d. at 1-2.
151This is particularly likely since important developed countries such as the United States hive
agreed to the drafting of the charter as a declaration. U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/2/Add. I at 45.
'
57Time, Dec. 10, 1973, at 33.
'The industrialized economies of the developed countries require vast amounts of imported raw
materials. See L. BLACK, supra note 1, at 17. While few natural resources are as essential and as
localized as oil reserves it is to be expected that developing countries will begin, individually and
in groups, to use the developed countries' needs for raw materials as a means to obtain benefits
from the developed countries. It would be to the benefit of world peace and prosperity if the
developing nations are not forced to resort to such weapons in their struggle for development.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warns of the dangers of countries attempting to use their
resources to "strong-arm" the industrialized countries and predicts the reaction to strong-arm
tactics to be the withholding of aid and the endangering of the world economy. Atlanta Constitu-
tion, April 16, 1974, at 12D, col. 1.
111J. BRIERLY, supra note 148, at 381.
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The United States has been presented throughout this paper as espousing
conservative approaches to the development aid problem. That country con-
trols much of the world's established wealth and if it refuses to sign a legally
binding document or to comply with the terms of a non-legally binding docu-
ment, the developing countries will be hard pressed to achieve their economic
goals absent a substantial increase in the aid efforts of other donor countries.
Therefore, the provisions of the charter must not completely alienate this im-
portant State. While a lack of participation by the United States in the first
session of the working group indicated that it was disinterested in a charter with
which it would not comply, the numerous suggestions made by that govern-
ment's representative in the second session 60 may be an indication to the con-
trary. The only provisions which the United States proposed to be deleted
concerned the restructuring of the world economic order, 6' the local control
of transnational corporations,'62 and the call for general disarmament. 3 Most
of the other suggestions were only minor modifications of the provisions sug-
gested by the developing countries, usually in the direction of providing more
leeway for the developed countries in the performance of their duties. The only
major exception to this is the complete disagreement concerning sovereignty
over natural resources and the rights of States to nationalize foreign investment
without adequate compensation.'64 It is the author's belief that the suggestions
made by the United States are not so conservative as to nullify the purpose of
the provisions and that with minor compromises on precise wording, both
developed and developing countries could find the draft charter with American
suggested provisions acceptable. If this is indeed true, then the United States
would be under considerable pressure to comply with the charter which it had
largely written. While this adoption of American-sponsored provisions may
prove galling to the more militant developing countries, it should be easily
recognized that a strongly-worded instrument lacking legal enforceability to
which the developed countries will not adhere is of little use to any of the parties
concerned.
As mentioned above, the form and content of the charter are directly related.
The less confining and restrictive the developed countries find the provisions,
the more likely they will enter into a more binding instrument. Conversely, the
more militant the provisions of the charter, the less likely the developing coun-
tries will be able to attain more than recommendation status for their charter
and the more likely that a moral victory will be all that the developing countries
can celebrate. This is the time for tempering enthusiasm and idealism with
political and economic reality. Hopefully all States will make the compromises
that will be needed to give the charter an opportunity to be effective.
'U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/a/Add. I at 17, 19, 26, 41, 42 and 45.
"lid. at 47.
" id. at 50.
163Id.
"lid. at 48.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Throughout more than twenty-five years of development aid, the expecta-
tions of both donor and donee countries have been battered by failure. Al-
though the goal of the donee countries has always been to achieve a higher
standard of living for their citizens, the methods have changed from aid alone
to the current mixing of trade plus aid in the draft charter on economic rights
and duties of States. Along with the changing types of aid have been changes
in the techniques for requesting aid. Originally each donee got whatever aid it
could by its own efforts. Then in the 1960's, the developing countries began to
group together in the United Nations to demand a change in basic economic
policy so that developing countries as a group would receive help from devel-
oped countries as a group. UNCTAD was established to pursue this goal but
thus far its efforts have resulted only in voluntary programs which fall short
of producing the desired effect. In the resultant atmosphere of unrest and
frustration, the call for a legally binding instrument which would enunciate the
economic rights and duties of all States was immediately acted upon and a
working group was established to draft such an instrument. The challenge for
the working group is to propose actions which will at least work toward meet-
ing the needs of the developing countries while not frightening the developed
countries into believing that their own economies will suffer substantially by
assisting their less fortunate neighbors. The United States has made several
suggestions in the drafting sub-groups and perhaps has opened the way to
acceptance of the compromise charter by both developed and developing coun-
tries. The working group will meet at least two more times before the General
Assembly receives the finished document. It is hoped that that will provide
sufficient time for diplomacy and negotiation to produce a viable document
which can be the foundation of the more "just and equitable economic and
social order ... " the charter envisions.
Joseph C. Vanzant
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